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DATA DRIVEN WEED MANAGEMENT: TRACKING HERBICIDE 
RESISTANCE AT THE LANDSCAPE SCALE 
A. Bryan Endres,* Natalie M. West,** Jeffrey A. Evans,*** Lisa R. 
Schlessinger**** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Limiting the prevalence of herbicide-resistant weeds requires con-
sistent, data-driven management implementation along with accompanying 
policy and legal frameworks designed to mitigate common-pool-resource 
problems.1 Although weed population dynamics operate at scales above 
farm-level, the emergent effect of neighboring management decisions on in-
field weed densities and the spread of resistance traits in the landscape re-
mains unclear. Further, the ability to empirically test these emergent out-
comes is limited by socio-cultural and economic barriers and management 
heterogeneity that impede contiguous implementation across space.2 There 
is well-supported agreement that large-scale implementation of diversified 
weed management is key to combating new weed invasions and the rise of 
herbicide resistance (HR).3 However, extensive evidence suggests scientific 
recommendations are minimally implemented by stakeholders. This limita-
tion widens a significant knowledge gap in our ability to evaluate or set 
long-term management targets. Moreover, existing regulatory approaches to 
weed management generally fail to address herbicide resistance at the land-
scape scale, and the increasingly diverse ownership and tenancy patterns in 
Midwestern farmland add to the complexity. An integrated, data-driven 
simulation model that predicts the spread of herbicide resistance traits, while 
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 1. See A. Bryan Endres & Lisa R. Schlessinger, Legal Solutions to Wicked Problems in 
Agriculture: Public-Private Cooperative Weed Management Structures as a Sustainable 
Approach to Herbicide Resistance, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 827, 829 (2016) (identifying herbi-
cide resistance as a common-pool-resource problem). 
 2. See infra notes 56–59 and accompanying text (discussing social and economic barri-
ers). 
 3. See generally Jason K. Norsworthy et al., Reducing the Risks of Herbicide Re-
sistance: Best Management Practices and Recommendations, 60 WEED SCI. 31 (2012). 
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accounting for existing social and legal complexities, can help to slow the 
growth and prevalence of herbicide resistance in the agricultural context. In 
other words, the use of enhanced data on landowner behavior, ownership 
patterns, and weed biology could provide a new means to control noxious 
weeds at a lower cost and toxicity. 
II. WEEDS AND HERBICIDE RESISTANCE 
Overreliance on herbicides, as well as lack of herbicide diversity, im-
poses intense selection pressure on weed populations and has independently 
driven the rise of herbicide resistance across major crop production areas of 
the U.S.4 “Herbicide resistance, defined as the inherited ability of a plant to 
survive and reproduce following exposure to a dose of herbicide normally 
lethal to the wild type,”5 originates through rare genetic mutation events.6 
However, resistance can be enriched rapidly by natural selection through 
repeated exposure to the relevant herbicides that are dispersed by numerous 
mechanisms at different spatial scales.7 Processes that operate beyond the 
field scale, but influence in-field weed prevalence, such as control of new 
infestations that reduces seed rain,8 depletion of weed seedbanks,9 and the 
hygiene of equipment or products that move seed and pollen among fields, 
would particularly benefit from aggregated efforts.10 While selection and 
enrichment are fundamentally local processes, managing the spread of HR 
traits depends on our ability to reduce gene flow both within and between 
individual farms by reducing seed and pollen production and minimizing the 
transport of weed seeds.11 
Unfortunately, regular integration of effective practices into annual 
weed management has been reduced, or only employed after severe weed 
infestations emerge, due to the overwhelming adoption of herbicide tolerant 
 
 4. See generally R.G. Wilson et al., Benchmark Study on Glyphosate-Resistant Crop-
ping Systems in the United States. Part 4: Weed Management Practices and Effects on Weed 
Populations and Soil Seedbanks, 67 PEST MGMT. SCI. 771 (2011); W. Vencill et al., Herbi-
cide Resistance: Toward an Understanding of Resistance Development and the Impact of 
Herbicide-Resistant Crops, 60 WEED SCI. 2 (2012). 
 5. Vencill, supra note 4, at 3. 
 6. Marie Jasieniuk, Anita L. Brule-Babel & Ian N. Morrison, The Evolution and Genet-
ics of Herbicide Resistance in Weeds, 44 WEED SCI. 176, 177 (1996). 
 7. Id. at 176. 
 8. A. Alignier & S. Petit, Factors Shaping the Spatial Variation of Weed Communities 
Across a Landscape Mosaic, 52 WEED RES. 402, 408 (2012). 
 9. See generally Adam S. Davis, When Does it Make Sense to Target the Weed Seed 
Bank?, 54 WEED SCI. 558 (2006) (discussing weed seedbanks). 
 10. Norsworthy, supra note 3, at 46. 
 11. Id. at 34–35. 
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cropping systems in the mid-1990s.12 Weed scientists commonly recom-
mend conservation tillage, control of late-emerging or residual weeds, crop 
rotation, and timing and application of herbicides with different chemical 
mechanisms of action (MOAs) as weed-control tactics to delay the spread of 
herbicide resistance.13 Although herbicide-tolerant crops were designed to 
be implemented as highly-effective tools in a diverse weed-management 
framework, their adoption instead led farmers to invest in increasingly sim-
plified weed-management systems, frequently relying on a single herbicide 
MOA (primarily glyphosate) over large areas and multiple growing sea-
sons.14 Wilson et al. (2011) found a majority of surveyed growers used 
glyphosate as the only herbicide for weed management, even though 98% of 
academic recommendations involve applying at least two herbicide active 
ingredients and MOAs.15 Consequently, selection pressures on weed popula-
tions have intensified and homogenized over time at large spatial scales, 
eroding the effectiveness of individual management tools such as glypho-
sate.16 
Additionally, farm-scale costs of herbicide resistance can be substan-
tial. For instance, Lambert et al. (2017) estimated the post-resistance chang-
es in weed-management costs ranged between $85 and $138 ha-1, with aver-
age costs increasing by $98 ha -1 following the establishment of herbicide-
resistant weeds in cotton-production systems.17 
Some important herbicide-resistance traits, on the other hand, have 
negligible fitness costs.18 In these cases, the frequency of the resistance trait 
 
 12. Michael D. K. Owen, Weed Resistance Development and Management in Herbicide-
Tolerant Crops: Experiences from the USA, 6 J. FÜR VERBRAUCHERSCHUTZ UND 
LEBENSMITTELSICHERHEIT (SUPPLEMENT 1) 85, 85 (2011); David A. Mortensen et al., Navi-
gating a Critical Juncture for Sustainable Weed Management, 62 BIOSCIENCE 75, 75 (2012). 
 13. See Vencill, supra note 4, at 2; see generally Norsworthy, supra note 3. 
 14. Hugh J. Beckie & Linda M. Hall, Genetically-Modified Herbicide-Resistant 
(GMHR) Crops a Two-Edged Sword? An Americas Perspective on Development and Effect 
on Weed Management, 66 CROP PROTECTION 40, 40 (2014); Bryan A. Young, Changes in 
Herbicide Use Patterns and Production Practices Resulting from Glyphosate-Resistant 
Crops, 20 WEED TECH. 301, 301 (2006). 
 15. Wilson, supra note 4, at 771. 
 16. See Thomas C. Mueller et al., Proactive Versus Reactive Management of Glypho-
sate-Resistant or-Tolerant Weeds 1, 19 WEED TECH. 924, 924–25 (2005). 
 17. Dayton M. Lambert et al., “Resistance Is Futile”: Estimating the Costs of Managing 
Herbicide Resistance as a First-Order Markov Process and the Case of U.S. Upland Cotton 
Producers, AGRIC. ECON. (2017) (estimating costs and noting that the efficacy of remedial 
practices will vary geographically, depending on the degree of establishment of herbicide-
resistant genes in weed populations and management costs). 
 18. See Martin M. Vila-Ajub et al., No Fitness Cost of Glyphosate Resistance Endowed 
by Massive EPSPS Gene Amplification in Amaranthus palmeri, 239 PLANTA 793, 793 (2014). 
Traits that offer competitive or survival advantages under select circumstances are often 
burdened with metabolic tradeoffs or fitness penalties that reduce performance in other sce-
narios. For example, if a resistance trait required producing large quantities of enzymes to 
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will increase unidirectionally toward saturation in surviving weeds each 
time the relevant herbicide is used.19 Because of this, the mixture and rota-
tion strategies outlined above will not prevent this process, although they 
may serve to delay it if implemented frequently in the landscape. From an 
implementation perspective, it is critical to understand that management 
decisions in real agricultural landscapes are not assembled into contiguous 
blocks of fields or farms, because individual operators, along with for-hire 
pesticide applicators, may manage fields scattered across a larger area with 
diverse farmland ownership. The interspersal of non-contiguous manage-
ment units affects the degree of exposure to gene flow that neighboring 
fields experience from surrounding weed populations. This spatial configu-
ration may have important repercussions for the level of participation re-
quired for cooperative weed-management units to succeed. The industry 
should integrate large-scale data on potential spatial patterns of farmland 
management across a region into a simulation model of resistance spread. 
This would allow comparisons of the efficacies of different social and legal 
frameworks to affect the spatial distribution of implementation and evaluate 
the capacity for large-scale coordinated management structures to slow 
herbicide resistance. 
III. CURRENT REGULATORY APPROACHES AND INCENTIVES TO CONTROL 
WEEDS 
Laws regulating invasive plant species or noxious weeds vary widely in 
their scope, interpretation, and application. These laws were first enacted in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries to protect agricultural interests from 
the spread of noxious weeds associated with changing land-use patterns.20 
More recent modifications to the multi-jurisdictional system of federal, 
state, and local regulations have incorporated a desire to protect the envi-
ronment and its ecosystem functions.21 The ecology of plant invasion and 
 
detoxify an herbicide, the plant would have to divert resources that would otherwise be in-
vested in growth or reproduction to manufacture them. In the absence of the herbicide, re-
sistant plants that produced these enzymes unnecessarily would be disadvantaged and should 
have relatively lower reproductive output than susceptible plants that did not produce them, 
and the frequency of the resistance trait should decrease over time. 
 19. Hugh J. Beckie, Herbicide-Resistant Weeds: Management Tactics and Practices, 20 
WEED TECH. 793, 802 (2006). 
 20. James S. Neal McCubbins et al., Frayed Seams in the “Patchwork Quilt” of Ameri-
can Federalism: An Empirical Analysis of Invasive Plant Species Regulation, 43 ENVT’L L. 
35, 45–47 (2013). 
 21. See David M. Lodge & Kirstin Shrader-Frechette, Nonindigenous Species: Ecologi-
cal Explanation, Environmental Ethics, and Public Policy, 17 CONSERVATION BIOLOGY 31, 
36 (2003). Although not technically a regulatory mandate with an impact on private persons, 
two presidential executive orders have further highlighted the need to consider the impact of 
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spread of noxious weeds differs across soil types, climatic conditions, and 
natural predators22 and thus avails itself to variability in regulatory scope 
across jurisdictions, with the majority of actions taking place at the state 
level against a relatively mild level of federal backstop for weeds with na-
tional implications.23 
At the farm-level, weed regulation plays a minimal role. As discussed 
below, regulatory programs focus on restricting the introduction and move-
ment of existing noxious weeds but have limited scope with respect to dic-
tating on-farm prevention or eradication measures. Moreover, state-based 
liability, whether civil or common law, is difficult. Thus, on-farm actions 
related to weed management is a function of economics—balancing the 
negative impacts on crop yield with the short-term costs of treatment—
rather than part of a broader strategy of control or eradication. 
A. State Weed Laws 
States regulate noxious weeds via an inadequate blacklist system in 
which specific plant species are restricted for sale or transportation within a 
particular jurisdiction.24 More than 600 individual plant species are included 
on these state-level lists.25 In an empirical evaluation of state noxious-weed 
regulations and a corresponding jurisdictional-specific literature review of 
plants considered to be invasive in that particular state, on average only 
19.6% of known invasive plant species were actually subject to regulatory 
 
invasive species on the environment. President Clinton, in 1999, issued the original executive 
order, and President Obama, in December 2016, amended the order to incorporate “consider-
ations of human and environmental health, climate change, technological innovation, and 
other emerging priorities into Federal efforts to address invasive species; and strengthens 
coordinated, cost-efficient Federal action.” Exec. Order No. 13112, 64 Fed. Reg. 6183 (Feb. 
3, 1999), available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-1999-02-08/pdf/99-3184.pdf; Exec. 
Order No. 13571; 81 Fed. Reg. 88609 (Dec. 5, 2016), available at https://www.federal
register.gov/documents/2016/12/08/2016-29519/safeguarding-the-nation-from-the-impacts-
of-invasive-species; National Invasive Species Information Center, LAWS & 
REGULATIONS - EXECUTIVE ORDER 13112, USDA, https://www.invasivespeciesinfo.
gov/laws/execorder.shtml (last visited July 8, 2017) (summarizing both executive orders). 
 22. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., NAT’L INVASIVE SPECIES INFO. CTR., PLANTS, http://www.
invasivespeciesinfo.gov/plants/main.shtml. 
 23. McCubbins et al., supra note 20, at 40. 
 24. Lauren D. Quinn et al., Navigating the “Noxious” and “Invasive” Regulatory Land-
scape: Suggestions for Improved Regulatory Performance, 63 BIOSCIENCE 125, 125 (2013). 
State noxious weed lists, however, are highly reactive and tend to prohibit species only after 
there has been significant damage to agricultural production or the environment. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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control by the state government.26 The result is massive under-regulation of 
known noxious and invasive plants.27 
The regulatory gap widens when one considers enforcement mecha-
nisms or other incentives for the control of noxious weeds. Effective en-
forcement of state weed control laws on private property is negligible, and 
there generally is no ex post liability scheme for the spread of weeds onto 
adjacent private property.28 Although state statutes may impose an affirma-
tive duty on the part of landowners to destroy noxious weeds on their prop-
erty, there is no corresponding provision for civil liability for any resulting 
damages if the weeds were to spread.29 This parallels the common law’s 
approach to weed invasion. 
The common law has treated the spread of weeds—even those that 
were intentionally introduced—as a “natural condition,” and thus outside the 
realm of strict liability30 or even nuisance.31 From a legal perspective, indi-
vidual land holdings are treated as isolated islands, separated from neighbor-
ing property by some invisible barrier, while ecologically they are connected 
and highly interdependent.32 Thus at the state level, the regulatory regime 
does not match ecological reality. 
B.  Federal Regulation of Noxious Weeds 
In a federalist system of government that observes the principles of 
subsidiarity,33 the regulation of invasive plants due to variability such as 
 
 26. Id. 
 27. States also over-regulate some plant species that are not considered invasive by the 
scientific community. In other words, the blacklist of noxious weeds also included many 
plants without noxious characteristics. Quinn, supra note 24, at supplemental materials 2–4. 
McCubbins et al, explored this over and under-regulation of noxious weeds from a structure 
perspective and found no statistically significant difference between noxious weeds listings 
controlled by administrative agencies, legislative bodies or local government entities. All 
performed equally poorly in coverage of noxious weeds. McCubbins, supra note 20 at 58–60. 
 28. McCubbins et al., supra note 20, at 48. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Vance v. S. Kan. Ry. of Tex., 152 S.W. 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912). But see, Collins 
v. Barker, 688 N.W.2d 548, 552 (S.D. 2003) (noting that landowner may not be liable for 
natural spread of weeds to neighbor’s property but allegations in the specific case went be-
yond what could be considered natural proliferation of weeds and thus could be a private 
nuisance). 
 31. See NEIL E. HARL, AGRICULTURAL LAW § 11.02, p. 11–15 (Matthew Bender & Co., 
Inc. 2010). 
 32. MICHAEL LIVINGSTON ET AL., USDA, ERR-184, THE ECONOMICS OF GLYPHOSATE 
RESISTANCE MANAGEMENT IN CORN AND SOYBEAN PRODUCTION 1, 11 (2015) (noting effec-
tiveness of weed control practices on one farm can depend on activities on nearby farms and 
the need for coordinated action by all neighboring farms). 
 33. See Robert K. Vischer, Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance: Beyond Devolu-
tion, 35 IND. L. REV. 103 (2001) (discussing limits of subsidiarity to address problems). 
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soil, climate, natural predators, and other factors could be an ideal candidate 
for primary action at the state or local level.34 For example, the United States 
has almost 600 different ecological systems that do not respect geo-political 
boundaries. 35 Attempting to regulate at the federal level could unnecessarily 
restrict access to plants in some regions in which there would be a low inci-
dence of negative impacts. But when subsidiarity fails as state and local 
governments cannot or will not act—as discussed above with respect to reg-
ulation of just over 19% of harmful plant species—the federal government 
may provide necessary backstopping provisions. Unfortunately, federal pro-
grams designed to regulate noxious weeds also fall short based on their reac-
tive, incremental, and piecemeal approaches.36 A brief historical summary of 
federal programs follows. 
In 1912, Congress enacted the Plant Quarantine Act (PQA) as an initial 
attempt to control the importation of nursery stock and control agricultural 
pests.37 The PQA, however, exempted many potentially harmful vectors for 
invasive plants, including seeds, bulbs, roots, and bedding plants.38 The 
1957 Federal Plant Pest Act (FPPA) expanded federal authority to include 
all potential plant pests—not just pests to nursery stock—but still did not 
include actual plants that might cause damage on their own through inva-
sion.39 In 1974, Congress created a new regulatory program designed specif-
ically to counter the negative ecological impacts of plants. The Federal Nox-
ious Weed Act (FNWA) granted the USDA the authority to develop a feder-
al Noxious Weed List to prevent the introduction or spread of harmful plants 
across the United States. The Plant Protection Act of 2000 (PPA) consoli-
dated the PQA, FPPA, and FNWA into a single statute and retained the nox-
ious weed list provisions.40 
Like its state-level counterparts, the federal PPA does not provide au-
thority to order removal of weeds on private lands, although there may be 
funding available to assist state or local governments’ efforts to engage in 
weed control measures.41 This funding, however, has been sparse and rela-
tively ineffective.42 Moreover, the USDA tends to include only well-
established plants on its noxious weed list that have documented negative 
 
 34. McCubbins et al., supra note 20, at 41–42. 
 35. Id. at 41. 
 36. Id. at 43. 
 37. Plant Quarantine Act, ch. 308, 37 Stat. 315 (1912); repealed by Plant Protection Act, 
ch. 104, § 7758, 114 Stat. 438 (2000). 
 38. McCubbins et al., supra note 20, at 43. 
 39. Federal Plant Pest Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-36, 71 Stat. 31 (1957); repealed by 
Plant Protection Act, ch. 104, § 7758, 114 Stat. 438 (2000). 
 40. Plant Protection Act § 438 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7701–7772 (2000)) (There are 87 
terrestrial plant species contained on the federal list); 7 C.F.R. § 360.200(c) (2012). 
 41. Noxious Weed Control and Eradication Act of 2004, 7 U.S.C. § 7782 (2012). 
 42. McCubbins et al., supra note 20, at 44. 
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impacts, thus foregoing any preventative or precautionary benefits to na-
tional control.43 
The result is a multi-layer regulatory program at state and federal levels 
that unfortunately lacks comprehensive coverage, reacts only to established 
noxious weeds rather than assuming a protective role, and at times does not 
make full use of scientific input as to the placement of species on the list.44 
Despite these limitations, there is a relatively high degree of weed control in 
the agricultural community due to the economic pressure weeds place on 
farming operations.45 In recent years, adoption of genetically engineered 
herbicide-resistant crops has replaced integrated crop rotations, non-
herbicide weed control, and cultural factors.46 These weed control activities, 
often provided by contract-based custom applicators, tend to be individual-
ized actions taken at the farm scale with little regard to broader impacts on 
the community or coordinated efforts,47despite general consensus among the 
weed science experts on best strategies to avoid resistance and manage weed 
infestations.48 
C. Economic Incentives 
Economic considerations drove the adoption of glyphosate-resistant 
crops.49 Short-term economic decisions further drove the over-reliance on 
glyphosate as the primary weed control method and the subsequent devel-
opment of glyphosate-resistant weeds.50 Economics can also play a role in 
resolving the problem of herbicide-resistant weeds. Specifically, Livingston 
et al (2017) developed a model that combined a biological model for weed 
 
 43. David M. Lodge et al., Biological Invasions: Recommendations for U.S. Policy and 
Management, 16 ECOLOGICAL APPLICATIONS 2035, 2039–42 (2006). 
 44. McCubbins et al., supra note 20, at 50–51. 
 45. David C. Bridges, Impact of Weeds on Human Endeavors, 8 WEED TECH. 392, 394 
(1994). 
 46. A. Bryan Endres & Lisa R. Schlessinger, Legal Solutions to Wicked Problems in 
Agriculture: Public-Private Cooperative Weed Management Structures as a Sustainable 
Approach to Herbicide Resistance, 3 TEX. A&M L. REV. 827, 836 (citing David Ervin & Ray 
Jussaume, Integrating Social Science into Managing Herbicide-Resistant Weeds and Associ-
ated Environmental Impacts, 62 WEED SCI. 403, 406–07 (2014)). 
 47. See generally W.B. Ennis et al., Impact of Chemical Weed Control on Farm Man-
agement Practices, 15 ADVANCES IN AGRONOMY 161 (1963) (describing increased use of 
herbicides); Bryan G. Young, Changes in Herbicide Use Patterns and Production Practices 
Resulting from Glyphosate-Resistant Crops, 20 WEED TECH. 301 (2006) (describing replace-
ment of sound weed and herbicide management practices with exclusive use of glyphosate 
for weed control). 
 48. See Norsworthy et al., supra note 3; see also LIVINGSTON ET AL., supra note 32, at 
11. 
 49. Endres & Schlessinger, supra note 46, at 836. 
 50. Id. at 836–37. 
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growth, biological resistance to glyphosate, and the economics of weed 
management to explore farm-level options to actively manage resistance 
(long-term approach) versus ignoring resistance (short-term perspective).51 
The study found that managing resistance may reduce returns in year one, 
but increases returns in year two and all subsequent years.52 Accordingly, a 
rational actor following the bio-economic model would actively manage 
resistance in order to increase returns beyond year one. 
Yet most farmers do not actively manage resistance.53 Barriers to a 
more active resistance management approach stem from economic and so-
cial considerations, such as the desire to deal with problems as they occur, 
expected future availability for a new herbicide with increased modes of 
action, focus on short-term profitability, lack of effective alternatives, and 
the need for increased management intensity relative to current practices 
using glyphosate or other broad-spectrum herbicides.54 Accordingly, a prac-
tical solution to herbicide resistance must move beyond a rational actor eco-
nomic model and address the human dimensions, including the social and 
cultural aspects of farming.55 Land ownership patterns, access (e.g., farm 
tenancy for short versus long-term occupancy), and cultural barriers to col-
lective actions can present significant obstacles to efficient herbicide-
resistant management across landscapes. Landscape-level problems, such as 
herbicide resistance, require broad-based solutions with multiple actors. 
Efforts to adopt community-based weed management strategies, a promising 
approach to effective control, are in their infancy56 and could benefit from 
more robust modeling and economic-based justifications to overcome exist-
ing social and cultural obstacles. To this end, an integrated, data-driven sim-
ulation model that predicts the spread of herbicide-resistant traits, while 
accounting for existing social and legal aggregations, can improve the ca-
pacity to slow the growth and prevalence of herbicide resistance in the agri-
 
 51. LIVINGSTON ET AL., supra note 32, at 11–12. 
 52. Id. at 13. 
 53. David J. Pannell et al., Herbicide Resistance: Economic and Environmental Chal-
lenges, 19 AGBIOFORUM 136, 145–46 (2016), http://www.agbioforum.org/v19n2/v19n2a05-
frisvold.htm. 
 54. See Beckie & Hall, supra note 14, at 3; see generally T. C. Mueller et al., Proactive 
Versus Reactive Management of Glyphosate-Resistant or-Tolerant Weeds 1, 19 WEED TECH. 
924 (2005); Edwards et al., Benchmark Study on Glyphosate-Resistant Crop Systems in the 
United States. Economics of Herbicide Resistance Management Practices in a 5 Year Field-
Scale Study, 70 PEST MGMT. SCI. 1924, 1925 (2014). 
 55. Endres & Schlessinger, supra note 46, at 835; David E. Ervin & George B. Frisvold, 
Community-Based Approaches to Herbicide-Resistant Weeds Management: Lessons from 
Science and Practice, 64 WEED SCI. 609, 609 (2016). 
 56. See generally Ervin & Frisvold, supra note 55 (advocating for community-based 
approaches to weed management); Endres & Schlessinger, supra note 46 (same). 
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cultural context and facilitate adoption among the diverse stakeholders with-
in the agricultural community. 
IV. DATA AND MODELING NEW STRATEGIES FOR WEEDS AND HERBICIDE 
RESISTANCE 
How to encourage diversified management among neighboring farmers 
remains a hurdle to large-scale management heterogeneity, and as such, the 
ability to evaluate weed-management efficacy and long-term resistance mit-
igation.57 Both theory and empirical research demonstrate the potential for 
weed-management enhancement when area-wide application of appropriate 
integrated management technologies are deployed.58 However, the scientific 
problem of weed gene movement and the consequences for agriculture can-
not be separated from the social dilemma of implementation.59 Many farm-
ers do not own the actual land they farm,60 leading to decisions based on 
short-term profits instead of long-term sustainability.61 Existing models for 
combatting herbicide resistance do not incorporate or consider the effective-
ness of strategies under conditions relevant to production farming, i.e., high 
incidences of shifting tenant occupancy on short-term leases with a patch-
work of ownership patterns.62 
 
 57. See A. Agrawal, Sustainable Governance of Common-Pool Resources: Context, 
Methods, and Politics, ANNOTATED REV. ANTHRO. 243–262 (2003); D. Ervin & R. Jussaume, 
Integrating Social Science into Managing Herbicide-Resistant Weeds and Associated Envi-
ronmental Impacts, 62 WEED SCI. 403, 405 (2014); J.R. Lamicchane et al, Integrated Weed 
Management Systems with Herbicide-Tolerant Crops in the European Union: Lessons Learnt 
from Home and Abroad, CRITICAL REV IN BIOTECH 6 (2016). 
 58. Michael J Brewer & Peter B. Goodell, Approaches and Incentives to Implement 
Integrated Pest Management that Addresses Regional and Environmental Issues 57 ANNU. 
REV. ENTOMOL. 41, 42 (2012). 
 59. M. D. Owen et al, Integrated Pest Management and Weed Management in the Unit-
ed States and Canada, 71 PEST MGMT. SCI. 357, 358 (2014); Edwards et al., Benchmark Study 
on Glyphosate-Resistant Crop Systems in the United States. Economics of Herbicide Re-
sistance Management Practices in a 5 Year Field-Scale Study, 70 PEST MGMT. SCI. 1924, 129 
(2014). 
 60. Approximately 40% of agricultural land is leased nationwide with rates approaching 
70% for some highly productive lands in Midwestern states. Edward Cox, A Lease-Based 
Approach to Sustainable Farming, Part I: Farm Tenancy Trends and the Outlook for Sus-
tainability on Rented Land, 15 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 369, 372 (2010). 
 61. Id. at 384; see also Elise C. Scott & A. Bryan Endres, Demanding Supply: Re-
Envisioning the Landlord-Tenant Relationship for Optimized Perennial Energy Crop Produc-
tion, 25 DUKE ENVTL. LAW & POLICY FORUM 101, 121–22 (2014) (describing a new approach 
to long-term farm leases and moving away from generic good husbandry clauses in favor of 
more specific conservation practices and monitoring requirements). 
 62. J.A. Evans et al., Managing the Evolution of Herbicide Resistance, 72 PEST MGMT. 
SCI. 74, 74 (2016). 
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Data-driven models for evaluating strategies to slow the spread and in-
crease mitigation of resistance must account for how management can be 
implemented within social frameworks. Specifically, farmers need sufficient 
practical examples and information to change management behaviors.63 In-
corporating real-world landscape data (ownership, tenancy duration, topog-
raphy) and farm economics into spatial models of weed population dynam-
ics and herbicide-resistance evolution could translate the abstract problem of 
herbicide resistance into terms that would aid local farmers in making actual 
management decisions.64 Models, moreover, should structure potential man-
agement scenarios to provide options and comparisons that will allow com-
munities to address issues of herbicide resistance collectively. Partnerships 
among local, spatially-aggregated stakeholders may provide the spatial con-
tinuity to combat regional common-pool-resources problems such as herbi-
cide susceptibility. 
Weed-control policymakers should incorporate public policy and legal 
management frameworks that have been successful in mitigating other 
common-pool-resource problems, like drainage and gas pooling and unitiza-
tion.65 Modeling efforts could inform development of legal frameworks for 
spatially coordinated and cooperative weed management that incentivize 
efficacious and economically attractive practices to mitigate herbicide-
resistance spread over contiguous land areas.66 But theoretical legal solu-
tions, whether through regulation or private law,67 face many of the same 
problems of implementation as the bio-economic models described above. 
Research has demonstrated that involving stakeholders in the decision-
making process, such as via focus groups or semi-structured interviews can 
provide legitimacy to recommended management policies.68 Incorporating 
focus group data on the human dimensions of the herbicide-resistance prob-
lem into existing bio-economic plus legal simulation models would more 
accurately inform the spatial spread in a way that science alone could not 
achieve. 
 
 63. Lamichhane et al, supra note 57, at 3. 
 64. Lucia González Díaz et al., Spatially Explicit Bioeconomic Model for Weed Man-
agement in Cereals: Validation and Evaluation of Management Strategies, 52 J. OF APPLIED 
ECOLOGY 240, 241 (2015). 
 65. Endres & Schlessinger, supra note 46, at 845–49. 
 66. R. F. Durant & J.S. Legge Jr., “Wicked Problems,” Public Policy, and Administra-
tive Theory: Lessons from the GM Food Regulatory Arena, 38 ADMIN. AND SOC’Y 309 (2006) 
 67. See, e.g., McCubbins et al, supra note 20 (recommending enhanced noxious weed 
regulations at the state level as well as a liability regime); Endres & Schlessinger, supra note 
46 (recommending development of community based weed management agreements mod-
eled on existing agricultural drainage district authorities). 
 68. Durant & Legge, supra note 66, at 3. 
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V. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Big data can enhance knowledge and understanding when considered 
in the appropriate context.69 Enhanced and more powerful models that pre-
dict weed invasions or herbicide resistance are increasingly important tools 
to quantify the implications of a range of agroecological issues. Evaluating 
how resistance traits spread and “behave” in landscapes with realistic, com-
plex spatial structures alone requires a diversity of data types and extensive 
computing resources. However, management strategies must be considered 
in the socio-cultural context of farming to adequately address potential solu-
tions and their consequences. This is not an impossible task, although it re-
quires nuanced understanding of multiple intersecting social relationships 
among stakeholders, such as between landlord and tenant, operators, and 
for-hire pesticide applicators, as well as with the chemical companies bun-
dling products in a one-size-fits-all package for the farmer. 
Changing agricultural practices and emerging weed problems, such as 
herbicide resistance, that require large scale implementation and evaluation 
demand increasingly sophisticated, multidisciplinary tools to provide deci-
sion support and recommendations. Landscape models of weed dynamics 
can help identify relevant spatial scales for effective management, but im-
plementation will be inhibited by social and legal limitations to deploying 
management at large scales. An important area of focus for future legal re-
search will be how to incorporate such considerations into functional 
frameworks to encourage small-scale modifications and partnerships neces-
sary for large-scale cooperative management efforts. Models that combine 
ecological, economic, and legal data to examine management outcomes 
from cooperative aggregations will help inform weed management at large 
spatial scales and provide valuable incentives for individuals to invest in 
long-term cooperative decision-making. 
 
 69. See Danah Boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data Provocations 
for a Cultural, Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon, 15 INFO., COMMC’N & SOC’Y 662, 
665–66, 670–71 (2012). 
